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4 Spain – Out with the Old: The Restructuring
of Spanish Politics
Guillem Vidal and Irene Sánchez-Vítores
4.1 Introduction
To paraphrase Polanyi (1944), there are certain critical periods during
which time expands. Studying these exceptional periods opens an
opportunity to shed light on the transforming dynamics of political
phenomena. Since the outbreak of the Great Recession in 2008, time
has expanded in Spanish politics. What used to be an imperfect
bipartisan system with a stable bipolar conﬂict structure has now
become a ﬂuid landscape with new actors and issues that have rocked
the ‘old’ political system. The combination of a political and an
economic crisis at the national and European levels has profoundly
transformed a political system that had been broadly stable. In this
chapter, we focus on the dynamics of transformation of Spanish
politics before and after the crises struck. To do so, we analyse two
elections before the beginning of the crisis (2004, 2008) and two
elections afterwards (2011, 2015) in depth.
We ﬁnd that the Spanish story, unlike the Portuguese one (Chapter 7 in
this volume) but similarly to that of Greece (Chapter 5), is one of trans-
formation. The elections before the crisis were characterised by two poles
identiﬁable on the left–right scale represented by the twomain parties, the
Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE). Cultural and terri-
torial issues dominated in this period as a satisfactory performance of the
economy kept economic issues inconspicuous. After the fall of Lehman
Brothers in 2008 and the subsequent European debt crisis in 2009, the
public debate shifted dramatically. Initially, the economy was the main
concern in the public arena, and economic issues dominated the debate in
the 2011 election. However, in the 2015 election we observe corruption
and political regeneration gaining prominence. The economic crisis co-
existed with a political crisis, which was also expressed in a reinvigoration
of territorial issues in a new context (i.e. Catalan independence). In this
new multipolar conﬁguration of political conﬂict, the new radical left
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(Podemos) drove these transformations by combining advocacy against
austerity and for political renewal.
This new scenario revealed different government–opposition
dynamics. While in opposition, the mainstream left (PSOE) followed an
accommodating strategy and joined the advocacy for political renewal.
Moreover, the PP was challenged for the ﬁrst time by a new centre-right
party – Ciudadanos – which combined issues of political renewal, re-
centralisation of the territorial organisation and opposition to Catalan
separatism.Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that the political space evolved from
a bipolar conﬁguration before the crisis to a multipolar one.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, in Section 4.2 we contex-
tualise the Spanish cleavage structure and review themain lines of conﬂict
by relying on existing literature. In Section 4.3, we then proceed to
describe the main actors and characteristics of the Spanish party system.
Next, in Section 4.4, the unfolding of the economic and political crisis
dynamics is discussed, allowing us to form expectations about the empiri-
cal results. These are presented next in Section 4.5. A general discussion
of the Spanish case concludes the chapter in Section 4.6.
4.2 Traditional and New Divides
After a long period of dictatorship, the societal divisions and the political
agency that emerged during the transition to democracy responded to
patterns similar to those of the democratic period in the 1930s (Gunther
et al. 1986: 14). After some turbulent years marked by a consolidation of
the party system and high levels of political violence (Bermeo 1997), the
election of 1993 set the lines of conﬂict for the following decades (Castro
2008; Ruiz Jimenez 2007). We argue that the Great Recession shook this
conﬁguration of the political space, which had been marked by a strong
alignment of the dimensions of conﬂict and a stable party system.
Spanish political conﬂicts have traditionally been articulated along the
left–right dimension, which Spanish citizens use for heuristic cues (Torcal
and Medina 2007: 277). This unidimensional meta-structure comprises
both economic and cultural dimensions, which are strongly aligned in the
case of Spain (Moreno 1999: 29–30; Rovny and Polk 2014: 8; Vidal
2017) and also encompass traditional cleavages such as religiosity and
social class (Cainzos and Voces 2015; Calvo et al. 2010). On the eco-
nomic dimension, the poles of the axis are represented by economic
liberalism on the right and welfare on the left. At the right-wing pole,
the PP stood for the promotion of private initiative and market liberal-
isation (Balfour 2005; Michavila Nuñez 2015). At the opposite pole, the
socialist party PSOE and the radical left coalition (IU) supported the
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development of thewelfare state and the ﬁght against economic inequality
(Mendez 2007; Urquizu 2015). However, the conﬂictual character of this
dimension has at times been reduced due to broad agreements on differ-
ent social and economic policies such as pensions (Fernández-Albertos
and Manzano 2012).
In contrast to the pacts and agreements reached over welfare policies,
cultural policies generally remained controversial, particularly in the pre-
crisis period.While the left aligned itself with cultural liberalism, the right
embraced patriotism and the defence of traditional values (Ruiz Jimenez
2010, 2007). This was particularly salient during Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero’s ﬁrst legislature (2004–2008) and led to a peak in polarisation
(Balaguer and Sanz 2010). The socialist party pushed for a social rights
agenda regarding issues such as equal marriage and abortion rights (Field
2009). Supported by the upper echelons of the Catholic Church and
conservative media outlets, the conservative PP launched a campaign
against the government, accusing it of shattering traditional family prin-
ciples (Sampedro and Seoane Perez 2009). At the same time, the ﬁght
against terrorism became politicised and salient, an issue that linked
security concerns with another structuring dimension of Spanish political
conﬂict: the territorial cleavage.
The territorial cleavage can be considered the third relevant
dimension of political conﬂict necessary to understand Spanish pol-
itics (Gunther and Montero 1994; Torcal 2010). This conﬂict mate-
rialises tensions regarding the territorial organisation of the state and
results in the presence of actors (i.e. regionalist parties) that have
small concentrated constituencies and strong veto power in the
national institutions. The 1978 constitution introduced a complex
four-level territorial organisation1 that attempted to dilute the poten-
tial territorial conﬂict in the national arena and channel it into
regional institutions (Colomer 1998; Romero 2012). However,
ethno-regionalist parties managed to consolidate their presence in
regional institutions and enter the national arena, becoming key
actors in government formation.
The territorial dimension has been articulated through a number of
issues, which include amongst others: political decentralisation or the
distribution of competences between the state and sub-state entities;
and interregional solidarity or the distribution of public investment
1 Although the Constitution does not fully set out the nature of the territorial administra-
tion, it does mention that besides the national government there will be autonomous
communities, provinces and local governments.
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amongst the regions or infrastructure policy.2 Catalonia and the Basque
Country stood out in this conﬂict, claiming self-determination rights
using different forms of political action. For instance, one of the salient
actors in the Basque self-determination movement was a terrorist orga-
nisation (ETA), which led to a close alignment of the territorial conﬂict
with cultural (security) conﬂicts. The PP campaign transformed the ﬁght
against terrorism from a valence issue into a positional issue by connect-
ing it to concerns about national identity (Astudillo 2009; Bonet et al.
2010).
To recapitulate, the structure of political conﬂict in Spain has three
dimensions: economic, cultural and territorial. We have argued that the
ﬁrst two were traditionally aligned along the left–right axis. We expect the
content of this conﬁguration to have changed with the economic and
political crises that unfolded after 2008. The political change that Kriesi
et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) observed in most of western Europe, however,
does not capture the recent political transformations in Spain. As discussed
in the ﬁrst chapter of this volume, ‘new’ cultural issues such as migration,
which were at the core of the transformations in NWE, are largely absent
from the political agenda in Spain (Encarnación 2004; Fernández-Albertos
and Manzano 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2009). Instead, and in line with the
overall argument put forward for southern Europe, the combination of
deep economic and political crises seems to have triggered changes in the
conﬁguration of the party system. Issues concerning political renewal have
become more salient, resulting in a reinterpretation of the cultural dimen-
sion of conﬂict. Before discussing these transformations and the crisis
dynamics, in the following section we ﬁrst review the characteristics of
the institutional setting and the party system.
4.3 Institutional Setting and Party System
The 1978 Constitution deﬁned Spain as a parliamentary monarchy with
high levels of political decentralisation and a fuzzy delimitation of com-
petences between administrations. This institutional design also perme-
ated party organisations, translating into different territorial equilibria
within the individual parties (Fabre 2010; Hopkin 2009). During the
transition to democracy, the territorial organisation was designed to
accommodate the expected territorial conﬂict but also to avoid the
2 The territorial dimension of conﬂict has frequently comprised national infrastructure
investment policies, using them as bargaining chips to obtain the support of ethno-
regionalist parties to pass other laws. However, this bargaining has also inﬂuenced the
internal organisation of parties, even the highly hierarchical PP (Castro 2008: 282), as the
conﬂict over hydroelectric resources has frequently shown.
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tensions that marked the Second Republic and led to the civil war in the
1930s (Gunther et al. 1986). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 99) point out,
the problem of stateness posed by Catalan and Basque nationalism was
one of the deﬁning challenges of Spain’s transition to democracy, and in
their view it was handled comparatively well relative to other countries
facing similar situations. Nevertheless, as this chapter will show, the
institutional framework set up during the transition to mitigate territorial
conﬂict did not make these tensions disappear, as they later resurfaced to
the forefront of political conﬂict.
In a gamble similar to the territorial reorganisation, in the 1970s the
electoral system was also designed behind a veil of ignorance about the
true distribution of prospective voters,3 and it has remained unchanged
since (Hopkin 2005: 376–377). Although formally proportional, it
includes corrective elements to favour government formation, turning
the formally proportional system into an almost majoritarian one (Lago
and Montero 2005). Traditionally, those who beneﬁted most from this
electoral system were mainstream ofﬁce-seekers and ethno-regionalist
parties with territorially concentrated support. In contrast, parties such
as Izquierda Unida (IU) with dispersed support have found the effective
threshold to be much higher, turning the electoral system into a strong
obstacle against electoral success (Montero 1998; Urdánoz 2008).
The combination of this institutional setting and the political conﬂict
resulted in two main features of the Spanish party system: an imperfect
bipartisanship and political parties strongly reliant on subnational struc-
tures. Two main parties dominated the political arena, but regional
parties also became key players in the case of minority governments
(Hopkin 2005). In terms of organisation, political parties struggled to
balance two opposing forces: intra-party discipline and territorial diver-
sity. National leaders were able to exert much control inside parliament,
3 The Spanish electoral law devises two parallel electoral systems, one for the Congress and
one for the Senate. That of the Congress is the main one. In this election the stakes are
higher given that it leads to the appointment of the prime minister. Furthermore, its
electoral rules are the ones applied by default in regional and local elections whenever
the region does not have its own electoral law, making them the most frequent in Spain
(Montero et al. 1992). Candidates present themselves in closed and blocked lists.
The electoral rules covers ﬁfty-two constituencies, which ﬁll the 350 seats according to
their population size, with a minimum of two seats for the least populated constituencies.
Most of the constituencies are allocated between three to ﬁve seats. That is, their size is
very small, contributing to the disproportionality. Within constituencies, the seats are
allocated using theD’Hondt formula. The Senate is chosen following different rules.Most
of the Senate is elected by direct suffrage in provincial constituencies. Voters can pick the
individuals for whom they cast their vote, even from different parties (panachage),
although this option is not frequently used by voters. The rest of the members of the
Senate are elected by the regional parliaments (Villodres and Pereira 2002).
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given that Spain is one of the countries with the highest levels of intra-
party discipline (Sánchez de Dios 1999: 159). At the same time, subna-
tional entities exerted considerable inﬂuence due to their control of
resources and regional state institutions and their contribution to the
parties’ electoral resources (Fabre 2010; Pallarés and Keating 2003;
Sánchez de Dios 1999).
Table 4.1 summarises the election results and party system features
for the years 2004–16.4 As the table indicates, the 2011 election shows
the ﬁrst signs of transformation of an otherwise stable party system.
With the emergence of the two new challenger parties in 2015 – and
the subsequent election in 2016 – we observe an explosion of volatility,
a corresponding increase in the effective number of parties and the
lowest proportion of votes for the mainstream parties recorded.
Although voter turnout declined in the 2011 election, the new parties
seemed to drive participation back to pre-crisis levels. All in all, the
changes initiated in 2011 seem to have been reinforced in 2015 and
consolidated in 2016. The Spanish party system went from being
dominated by two main parties to a scenario with four parties, two
on each side of the ideological spectrum.
PP and PSOE are the two mainstream parties. The period under study
starts when PSOE unexpectedly5 regained ofﬁce after eight years of PP
government. The successes and failures of PSOE in the 1980s and early
1990s left it a party in deep trouble, from which it only managed to
recover in the initial phase of Rodriguez Zapatero’s leadership (Rico
2007; Urquizu 2015). Zapatero’s ﬁrst legislature was articulated around
the extension of civic rights and a revitalisation of the territorial conﬂict,
while the second legislature focused on the outbreak of the economic
crisis. PSOE’s perceived incapacity to manage the crisis and be loyal to its
constituencies generated tensions that led to severe disputes within the
party.
On the right of the spectrum, PP had long been the only contestant.
From 2003, Mariano Rajoy acted as party leader after a personal
decision by former president Aznar (Michavila Nuñez 2015). Rajoy
proved to be a political survivor, losing three elections before he won
his ﬁrst in 2011, due to a debacle in the socialist party. During his time
4 The recall election held in 2016 is not included in the analyses of political conﬂict given
that the issues are close to the ones dealt with in the preceding campaign. However, we do
include the election in the introduction to describe its outcome and to fully cover the crisis
period.
5 This victory was unexpected because the polls predicted that the PP would again win the
election, but the 11 March terrorist attacks right before the 2004 election appear to have
inﬂuenced the electoral result (see Montalvo 2012).
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in ofﬁce, he cultivated the image of a trustworthy man (Botti 2013;
Martínez and Rodríguez 2015), allowing him to remain in ofﬁce
despite a succession of corruption scandals and the implementation of
drastic austerity policies. During his ﬁrst legislature, some of the regio-
nal allies voiced discontent, one of the most notorious being former
minister Francisco Alvarez-Cascos, who founded his own party, FAC.
In the 2015 and 2016 elections, however, all of these voices were
appeased, and they re-edited existing coalitions such as the one in
Navarre with UPN.
Table 4.1 Spanish election results and party-system features
Election 2004 2008 2011 2015 2016
Election results (vote share)1
Mainstream right (PP) 37.7 40.4 45.2 28.9 33.0
Mainstream left (PSOE3) 42.6 44.4 29.2 22.1 22.6
Mainstream others 5.0 5.0 11.8 3.7 -
IU/Unidad Popular (radical left) 5.0 3.8 7.0 3.7 -
UPyD (center-right) - 1.2 4.8 - -
Ethnorregionalist4 11.0 7.2 10.4 9.7 9.7
Challenger left (Podemos) - - - 18.1 18.4
Challenger right (Ciudadanos) - - - 14.0 13.1
Party system features
Turnout (percent) 75.7 73.8 68.9 73.2 66.5
Volatility extra-system 1.3 1.3 2.4 24.8
Volatility within-system 8.4 2.7 12.2 11.5
Volatility total 9.7 4.0 14.6 36.3
Effective number of parties (seats) 2.5 2.3 2.6 4.5 4.2
Mainstream party vote 85.3 89.8 86.2 54.7 55.6
Asymmetry5 9.8 6.6 −13.8 −3.1 −10.4
Polarisation (0 to1; own media data) 0.17 0.26 0.19 0.35 -
1 The table only reports the vote share of parties that made it to Parliament.
2 Vote share includes the percentage obtained by parties that have ran in coalition with PP
such as UPN, PAR or FAC in 2015.
3 Vote share includes the percentage obtained by PSOE-PSC. Sometimes it is reported
separately due to the peculiar relationship between the Catalan party and the national
federation.
4 Some of these parties have changed brands across elections. They have been reported
together to ease interpretation of the table.
5 This indicator is calculated by subtracting the vote for mainstream right to the mainstream
left.
Asymmetry = (PSOE+IU/UP) – (PP+UPyD)
Sources: Own calculations, ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016), volatility from Hernández
and Kriesi (2016).
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Although our results do not show a large presence of regionalist actors
in the electoral campaigns,6 their content and development cannot be
understood without the key role of these actors in agenda-setting and
government formation (Bonet et al. 2010). Their territorially concen-
trated political support made some of them government parties in their
regions (mainly PNV and CiU) but vote-seekers in the national arena,
able to place their demands on the agenda. The overlap of cleavages
reﬂects the difﬁculties that national parties face in these regions as they
compete on every dimension. In other words, there are leftist ethno-
regionalist parties like ERC and Bildu, and rightist regionalist parties
such as PNV and CiU.
Finally, during the pre-crisis period, two parties became proto-
challengers: Izquierda Unida (radical left) and UPyD (moderate right).
Both parties tried to challenge the status quo, advocating for a better
quality of democracy, amongst other issues. IzquierdaUnida is a coalition
of very small radical left parties, including the Communists. The short-
lived UPyD was founded by Rosa Díez, a former socialist leader, in 2007
after discontent with the way the party managed issues related to decen-
tralisation. It dissolved after the 2015 election.7
4.4 Crises and Crisis Dynamics
The electoral dynamics of the crisis followed a two-stage process. First, as
the economic voting literature would predict, the incumbent was pun-
ished and voters turned to the mainstream opposition. PSOE lost the
2011 election to PP, which won an absolute majority (186 seats and
44.6 percent of the vote). Second, the poor performance of the incumbent
and the incapacity of the opposition to offer different policy solutions
opened a window of opportunity for new actors to enter the political
competition. In the 2015 election, although PP remained the most
voted party, its vote share decreased substantially (123 seats and 28.7 per-
cent of the vote), while PSOE was unable to capitalise on the shifting vote
(ninety seats and 22 percent of the vote). Two new forces emerged on
either side of the political spectrum – Podemos (new radical left) and
6 Regionalist parties are excluded from the empirical analysis due to the low number of
observations that are reported in the selected newspapers. Given that the newspapers
analysed have a national readership, they tend to over-represent national actors at the
expense of regional parties. This explains the limited number of cases compared to their
prominence in the political arena.
7 UPyD and IU have been labelled proto-challengers because they intended to play this role
in the political system but were never able to succeed in the way Podemos andCiudadanos
did. UPyD disappeared because Ciudadanos occupied its space, and IU is struggling to
ﬁnd a place, whether as a competitor of Podemos or as an ally.
82 Guillem Vidal and Irene Sánchez-Vítores
Ciudadanos (centre-right) – which beneﬁted from these ﬂoating voters,
putting an end to the political dynamics that had been dominant for
decades.
After apparently solid economic growth since the mid-1990s,
Zapatero’s cabinet faced the ﬁnancial crisis following the fall of Lehman
Brothers in 2008 with optimism, assuring citizens that ‘the Spanish
economy is well prepared to face a situation like the one that we have
gone through with the turbulence of the ﬁnancial sector’.8 However, such
optimism proved to be ill-founded (for a review of the causes, see Royo
2014). By 2010, the same socialist government had completely shifted its
discourse and talked about ‘special, singular and extraordinary efforts’
regarding the austerity policies introduced to face the economic down-
turn, including raising taxes, cutting salaries, reducing pensions and
reigning in social spending.
The implementation of the neoliberal recipes foisted on Spain by the
Troika continued with the approval of a labour market reform and
a change to the constitution agreed with PP to cap public debt (article
135 of the Constitution). In a fashion very similar to the dynamics behind
the collapse of many Latin-American party systems during the 80s as
described by Roberts (2013), the Spanish party system witnessed
a neoliberal convergence of the two main parties. PSOE favoured
‘responsibility’ instead of ‘responsiveness’ (Mair 2009), at the cost of
being perceived to be an undifferentiated alternative to the mainstream
right. In Lupu’s (2016) words, this produced a brand dilution that
reduced the differences between the two mainstream parties.
It was precisely this lack of perceived differences between the two
mainstream parties that was voiced with the slogan ‘PP and PSOE are
the same’ in the protests that took place inMay 2011, triggered by several
organisations, amongst which ‘Democracia Real Ya’ (Real Democracy
Now!) stood out. As in other countries (della Porta 2015), a wave of anti-
austerity protests gave way to a newmovement: the Indignados or ‘15-M’
movement. Their claims were not limited to anti-austerity but also arose
from concerns about the Spanish political system and widespread corrup-
tion (Anduiza et al. 2014; Calvo 2013). Amidst the turmoil in the protest
arena and after a rocky legislature, Prime Minister Zapatero called an
early election for November 2011.
This election was mainly dominated by economic concerns and the
government’s lack of ability to restrain unemployment rates. Although
the Indignados movement had already raised concerns relating to the
8 See www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/09/16/espana/1221587906.html (accessed 12 April
2018).
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political crisis, soaring unemployment and worsening economic indica-
tors monopolised the political discussion. In fact, unemployment
remained the most important problem in the eyes of the citizens.9
At the time of the election, the political crisis did not materialise institu-
tionally, amongst other things because no institutional actor credibly
represented preferences for democratic renewal.
PP’s landslide victory, however, neither deterred the introduction of
further austerity measures nor appeased a growing sense of political
dissatisfaction reﬂected in the growing levels of mistrust towards key
political institutions (García-Albacete et al. 2016; Muro and Vidal
2016). In fact, a series of corruption scandals further contributed to the
widespread disenchantment. As Orriols and Cordero (2016: 6) point out,
the three largest scandals were the Gürtel case, the Bárcenas papers and
the ‘black credit cards’ of Caja Madrid/Bankia. Unsurprisingly, corrup-
tion and the political elite soon became the issues of most concern to the
Spanish citizenry. Given the new government’s incapacity to ameliorate
the economic situation in addition to the corruption scandals, it did not
take long for its support to decline.
In 2014, a new party called Podemos ran in the European election and
surpassed all expectations in the polls, obtaining close to 8 percent of the
vote. With an explicit anti-austerity agenda and an unequivocal populist
rhetoric, the new formation presented itself as a party of the people inspired
by the Indignados movement. Founded by a group of political science
lecturers and leftist activists, Podemos at ﬁrst tried to appeal to
a heterogeneous platform by focusing on political discontent and anti-
elitism. However, leftist activists and their own electorate soon pushed
them within the radical left, to the despair of those in the party who
advocated against left–right politics (Fernández-Albertos 2015; Galindo
et al. 2015). This inconsistency seems to have hindered Podemos’ capacity
to fully beneﬁt from the turbulent situation amongst the socialist ranks.
In a very short period the newcomermanaged to connect with the wider
sense of dissatisfaction deriving from the economic and political crisis,
particularly appealing to the young, urban and educated strata of society
that showed clear signs of distrust towards the main political institutions
(Vidal 2017). In 2015, with the support of smaller factions of the party at
the municipal level in large Spanish cities such as Barcelona, Madrid,
Valencia and A Coruña, Podemos obtained 20.7 percent of the vote.
Changes were not limited to the conﬁguration of the left camp in the
party system. The right also saw the rise of a challenger: Ciudadanos,
9 Corruption only started becoming a main issue in 2011 (see Orriols and Cordero 2016).
Until then, unemployment was the main issue.
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which obtained 14 percent in the 2015 election. Rodríguez-Teruel and
Barrio (2015) identify two main reasons for this breakthrough. On one
hand, the continued uncovering of corruption scandals within PP facili-
tated Ciudadanos’ capitalisation on demands for “political renewal,
transparency and democratic regeneration” (Rodríguez-Teruel and
Barrio 2015: 2), a fertile ground also exploited by Podemos. On the
other hand, the strengthening of the territorial dimension in Catalonia
weakened the Catalan branch of PSOE (PSC), opening a space for an
outspoken anti–Catalan nationalist party.
TheCatalan secessionist challengewas, in fact, a fundamental aspect of
the political crisis. While the pre-crisis period was dominated by security
concerns and disagreement over the way to defeat terrorists in the Basque
country, the within-crisis period revolved around Catalan claims for
independence. A reform of the Statute of Autonomy and a ruling by the
Constitutional Court led to a surge in confrontation between Catalan and
national elites. The arrival of PP in government and the implementation
of austerity only added fuel to this conﬂict (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel
2016: 10). A demonstration on 11 September 2013 showed that the
conﬂict had taken on a different meaning amongst citizens, producing
a whole new level of support.10 Instead of further autonomy, indepen-
dence became the main demand. The revival of the Catalan issue has
been attributed to a process of ethnic polarisation based on elite-driven
motivations (Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2016) in which identity, as
well as partisanship, were the main drivers of support for secession
(Muñoz and Tormos 2015). While PP and Ciudadanos had a clear posi-
tion regarding the territorial organisation, both PSOE and Podemos
struggled to place themselves on this issue. Podemos supported holding
a referendum but PSOE rejected it, supporting a constitutional reform
instead.
The reinvigoration of the Catalan conﬂict and the emergence of two new
parties on different sides of the political spectrum left the socialists in
a difﬁcult situation. Despite the initial reluctance to take a position in the
political spectrum, Podemos became a solid competitor on the left,
while Ciudadanos positioned itself on the moderate right. In this new
scenario, the socialist party had little choice but to adapt its discourse and
distance itself from its recent past, although the new leadership did not
10 The movement in favour of Catalan independence holds demonstrations every
11 September, the Catalan national day, commemorating the fall of Catalonia to
Bourbon troops in 1714. Since 2012, mass demonstrations have been held but none as
successful or as widespread as the one held in 2013. That year, the Catalan National
Assembly coordinated citizens to make a human chain that stretched over 400 km.
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necessarily reﬂect this change.11 If the party was to retain its image of
a transformative force in Spanish politics, it had to incorporate the demands
for political renewal raised by the new challengers. We expect that being in
opposition facilitated PSOE’s adoption of the demands for political renewal.
In sum, the crisis dynamics in Spain were the product of an interplay
between a deteriorating economy, a substantial loss of credibility on the
part of the traditional parties and a strengthening of the Catalan terri-
torial conﬂict that followed. Following a period marked by stability, the
economic shock introduced these new issues onto the political agenda
and brought about volatility and political incertitude. We expect our
evidence to show the potential for a new multipolar structure of conﬂict
revolving around austerity, political renewal and the reinvigoration of
the territorial conﬂict. After the socialists’ debacle in 2011, a space
opened up for a leftist alternative to tap into feelings of anti-elitism and
anti-austerity (see Hutter et al. 2018). We expect Podemos, the new
left challenger, to induce an alignment of left economic issues and
democratic renewal. Likewise, a space on the centre-right opened up
for a challenger able to combine the transversal claims for democratic
renewal (i.e. anti-corruption) with a new strain of the territorial conﬂict
expressed in the Catalan secessionist challenge. Ciudadanos, the new
liberal party, seized this new space. Finally, we also expect
government–opposition dynamics to be reﬂected in these
transformations.
4.5 The Content and Structure of Party Competition
In this section, we describe the dynamics of party competition during the
electoral campaigns as reported by the media. To observe the impact of
the crisis we cover two elections before the outbreak of the Great
Recession (2004, 2008) and two elections afterwards (2011, 2015).12
We begin by discussing the salience and politicisation of the main issues
that structured the campaigns over time together with the parties’ posi-
tioning on these issues. We then explore the transforming conﬁguration
of the political spaces.
11 In fact, the new candidate was Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, who had previously acted as
vice-president, minister of the interior and spokesperson for the government, thus not
signifying a strong break with past policies.
12 Although some of the results of the 2016 election are also discussed, this election became
mostly about parties blaming each other for the need to repeat the election.Moreover, the
story told in this chapter is about the transformative nature of the elections in which new
challengers emerged, and which the 2016 one did not change.
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Salience and Politicisation
A comparison of the salience and politicisation (salience x polarisation) of
the main issues covered in the pre-and post-crisis campaigns largely
conﬁrms our expectations about the main issues that structured party
competition in Spain. Figure 4.1 illustrates the salience and politicisation
of a set of aggregate issues during each of the campaigns covered.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the party positions with regard to the different
issue levels.
In the 2004 campaign, the most salient category is that of ‘old’ cultural
issues, which encompasses issues relating to security and defence. One of
the key components of this issue is related to terrorism. At the time, the
Basque terrorist organisation ETA was being relentlessly pursued by the
police with notable detentions. Fighting terrorism thus became the most
discussed issue during the campaign. PP tried to build issue ownership on
security and the ﬁght against terrorism, particularly after Carod Rovira
(the ex-leader of the left-wing Catalan nationalist party ERC) was found
to have met with members of the organisation and received offers of
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Figure 4.1 Salience and politicisation by issue domain in Spain
Note: The salience and politicisation measures are based on aggregates
of the respective sub-categories shown in Table 3.2. For Spain, we
coded the following two newspapers: El Mundo and El País (for details,
see Chapter 3).
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a ceaseﬁre only in Catalonia. Until then, ﬁghting terrorism had been
a valence issue, but disagreements over the strategy to disband ETA led
PP to put the issue on the agenda,13 which explains the low levels of
politicisation of the issue reported in Figure 4.1. The participation of
Spain in the Iraq war also contributed to the salience of the category,
with PSOE promising to withdraw troops and PP planning to keep them
in the ﬁeld. The Iraq war issue, however, was secondary to terrorism.14
These issues would linger on into the next legislature, when the socialist
government pursued negotiations that led to a permanent ceaseﬁre
(Leonisio et al. 2016) and pulled out the troops from Iraq. At the same
time, this period was also characterised by growing demands of the
Catalan and Basque autonomies for further recognition, which led to
a negotiation of new autonomy laws in an attempt to mitigate territorial
tensions.
2004
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2015
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2008
2011
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PP PSOE
Podemos Ciudadanos
IU UPyD
Figure 4.2 Positions of the Spanish parties by issue domain
Note: The positional measures exclude the two ‘vague’ categories
referring to the need for economic and political reforms in general (see
Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 on methods).
13 PNV/Abertzale left were strongly criticised for their ambivalence regarding terrorism.
At this point, the Ajuria Enea Agreement was broken, and PP and PSOE stopped being
a united front supporting each other’s policies.
14 Note that three days before the election Spain witnessed its worst Al-Qaeda terrorist
attack. The proximity to the election day made it largely absent from the sample.
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One of the substantial differences between the 2004 and 2008 cam-
paigns is the emphasis on cultural liberalism. During the legislature, the
winning party of the 2004 elections, PSOE, focused heavily on civil rights
issues such as abortion, allocations for dependents, gender quotas and
equal marriage, despite the social resistance rallied by the Catholic
Church. This is reﬂected in the most salient issues of the 2008 campaign
in the ‘new’ cultural category, which encompass all these cultural issues
relating to civil rights but also immigration-related issues. The socialist
government eased the process of naturalisation, and this was not well
received by the conservatives. The PP responded by trying to build
a position problematising migration, particularly that from Muslim coun-
tries. This is clearly reﬂected in the high degree of polarisation and the
correspondingly high level of politicisation of ‘new’ cultural issues in
Figure 4.1. Although early signs of the economic crisis already started to
show during the 2008 campaign, issues relating to welfare had not yet
become polarised.However, the debate around cultural issues also spurred
the debate around democratic reform. UPyD ran for the ﬁrst time in this
election to capitalise on this issue,15 although with very modest results, as
can be seen fromTable 4.1. Overall, these results suggest that the pre-crisis
elections were dominated by the territorial and cultural dimensions of
conﬂict, reﬂecting a bipolar conﬁguration of the political space.
Furthermore, the results conﬁrm the highly polarising nature of cultural
issues, except for terrorism, which remained salient but not polarised.
In terms of issues, the picture changed radically with the ﬁrst crisis
election in 2011. Economic liberalism andwelfare became themost salient
issues by far, completely structuring the conﬂict in the campaign.
The economic crisis was unleashing its full effects, and the political debate
mostly focused on issues relating to austeritymeasures and reforms, such as
privatising health care, reducing unemployment, estate tax, budgetary
rigour, retirement provisions and social justice. The increase in salience
of economic issues trumped that of cultural issues. Political renewal,
mostly pushed by UPyD, obtained some traction after the 15-Mmobilisa-
tions, but the political issues were overshadowed by economic concerns.
As anticipated, the 2015 campaign shows a different stage of the
crises. Economic liberalism and welfare-related issues were still highly
salient. However, the results also show some differences with respect
to 2011. For instance, regionalism was no longer related to Basque
terrorism but to the Catalan claim for independence. The Catalan
secessionist challenge was by far the most recurrent issue during the
15 Although UPyD ran for the ﬁrst time in the 2008 election, our results do not include it
because of the low number of observations.
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campaign. Traditionally, territorial organisation had related to demo-
cratic and power-sharing views: leftist parties in Spain supported
a more decentralising approach while the right preferred more centra-
lisation. Faced with the challenge of a secession referendum, circum-
stances forced both old and new parties to take positions, as Figure 4.2
shows. Ciudadanos has run on a platform against Catalanism since its
foundation and stands strongly against independence. Likewise, PP
defended national unity as a strategy to improve its electoral gains
outside Catalonia. In the left camp, the limits of power-sharing caused
more tensions within the parties. While Podemos advocated holding
a referendum but campaigned in against secession, the socialists were
divided between different forms of federal solutions.
Besides the economy and the Catalan referendum, the political crisis re-
emerged, agitatedmainly by the newparties. Issues such as political renewal,
reforms of the political system, direct democracy and the ﬁght against
corruption became an integral part of the political conﬂict. If in the region-
alist conﬂict Podemos stood alone against all the other national parties, with
respect to political renewal it was the PPwhichwas opposed to all the others.
The dominant dynamic was that of government–opposition. The new par-
ties had strong incentives to build platforms on these issues, insisting on their
novelty as opposed to existing institutionalised bad practices.
Overall, the crisis campaigns show a picture that is very different from
that of the pre-crisis campaigns, with a new radical left party leading these
transformations. Cultural issues are replaced by issues relating to political
reforms, while regionalist issues change in content and are largely intensi-
ﬁed. The 2015 election was dominated by issues concerning political
renewal and the Catalan secessionist challenge, conﬁrming the incapacity
of the political system to circumscribe the territorial conﬂict to the subna-
tional arenas. Tobetter observe the conﬂict alignments, structuring dimen-
sions and government–opposition dynamics, we turn to the more
sophisticatedmethods ofmultidimensional scaling to observe the relational
distances between the different issues and actors across the elections.
The Political Space in Spain
Using graphical representations of multidimensional scaling for the issues
and party positions, we can shed light on the structures of party competi-
tion over time and observe how conﬂicts relate to one another. Figure 4.3
shows the structure of political spaces in the 2004, 2008, 2011 and 2015
campaigns.
At ﬁrst glance, we observe a similar structure for the ﬁrst two elections.
This begins shifting in 2011 and fundamentally transforms in 2015.
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The evidence shows that in the pre-crisis elections there is a strong inte-
gration of the economic and cultural dimensions, the opposite poles being
represented by PP – closer to issues such as economic liberalism, defence,
security and immigration – and PSOE – closer to welfare, cultural liberal-
ism, education, regionalism and the environment. This largely conﬁrms
the expectation of an aligned structure of conﬂict on the left–right dimen-
sion producing a bipolar conﬁguration, which has been reported to be of
particular importance in the case of Spain (Rovny and Polk 2014).
A closer look at the conﬁguration in 2011 shows the ﬁrst signs that
a transformation was under way. Both IU andUPyD stand close to political
reform and new politics, foreshadowing the structure that ultimately deﬁned
the 2015 election. However, as discussed in the previous paragraphs, the
2011 election largely focused on economic issues. It nonetheless represents
a transition stage to a period where the mainstream options were not able to
truly differentiate from one another and new alternatives emerged.
Lastly, the 2015 campaign data shows the aftermath of a political earth-
quake. Two new parties enter the scene, raising democratic renewal issues.
Three points call for attention. First, Podemos and Ciudadanos were
aligned with issues regarding democratic reform. Even if Ciudadanos
successfully capitalised discontent on the right, Podemos, the new left,
should be credited with having put the issue on the agenda, institutionalis-
ing demands that had frequently been heard at demonstrations since the
outbreak of the crisis. Second, the fact that two direct competitors gave
salience to issues of democratic renewal forced PSOE, themainstream left,
to reposition itself. It could do this because it was in opposition. Third, the
territorial dimension remained a cross-cutting conﬂict throughout the
entire period, even if the content substantively changed. While the new
parties shared views on the need for renewal, they were strongly split over
how to address the Catalan situation, with Podemos defending the nego-
tiations to hold a referendum and Ciudadanos opposing them on the
grounds that consultations are illegal and against national unity. These
dynamics created a new conﬁguration of conﬂict with multiple poles, as
can be observed from the enlargement of the grey areas in Figure 4.3.
Whereas in the pre-crisis period the main actors aligned along a single
dimension, the 2011 and most notably the 2015 elections show how the
public debate enlarged around the issues of political renewal and austerity.
4.6 Conclusions
In line with the ideal-typical scenarios for southern Europe depicted in the
introduction to this volume, the story of Spain is that of a process of
transformation. The Great Recession triggered a political crisis of major
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proportions that introduced pronounced changes in the party system con-
ﬁguration and the political agenda. We ﬁnd that the pre-crisis elections
displayed a stable bipolar competition betweenPP andPSOE, supported by
ethno-regionalist parties. Cultural issues, security concerns and the territor-
ial conﬂict dominated the public debate. In contrast, the crisis elections
exhibited volatility and change. This change was driven by demands for
political renewal and anti-austerity positions together with the Catalan
secessionist crisis facilitating Spain’s transformation to a multipolar party
system with the emergence of two new parties: Podemos and Ciudadanos.
Overall, the Spanish experience deviates from the general southern
European expectations in two main respects. First, a new liberal party
emerged, linked to the activation of the territorial conﬂict. Second, no
populist radical-right party emerged during the crisis period.
As in the other southern European countries, the economy played
a prominent role in the ﬁrst Spanish crisis election (2011). Although
some signs of political dissatisfaction and demands for political renewal
were already present in the protest arena, the debate centred around
austerity measures and reforms. The implementation of austerity policies
by the socialist government during the legislature showed a certain degree
of convergence between themain ofﬁce-seeking parties. This lack of a clear
political alternative opened the space for new actors to enter the political
competition. The second crisis election (2015) reﬂected this new structural
space with the emergence of a new populist left party: Podemos.
Comparable to the Greek experience (Chapter 5), a new party on the left
could capitalise on the erosion of the social-democrats due to the imple-
mentation of austerity policies enforced by supranational institutions, even
if the Spanish socialist debacle was a lot more moderate.
While the emergence of Podemos ﬁts the general story of SE quite
accurately, the Spanish case deviates from the expected general pattern,
as a new centre-liberal party, Ciudadanos, also emerged. Building on its
experience in Catalan politics, it ran both as a response to the Catalan
secessionist challenge, which became an integral part of the political crisis,
and as another option to renew the political landscape and substitute the
existing corrupt elite. A secondparticularity of the Spanish case is that none
of the new challenger parties belonged to the populist radical right. Several
interpretations have been advanced for this phenomenon, such as the fact
that the territorial dimension in Spain implies that the nativist discourse is
already ‘occupied’ (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser 2015), that migrants
were already amongst the unprotected in a strongly dualised labour market
(Fernández-Albertos and Manzano 2016; Zapata-Barrero 2009) and that
there simply was no political agent capable of succeeding. In this respect,
our ﬁndings show that despite the PP’s feeble attempt to politicise the
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immigration issue in the 2008 campaign neither the structural space nor
the content of political conﬂict facilitated any possibility for such a type of
party to capitalise on the discontent. This might be changing with the
emergence of VOX, a populist radical right party that obtained 11 percent
of the vote in the regional elections of Andalucia on December 2018 and
that could make it to the national Parliament in the next general elections.
Although the story told in this chapter stops with the emergence of the
new challengers in the 2015 election, it is important to add some lines on
the events that followed. The 2015 election resulted in a virtual tie between
the four front-runners, to the point that none of them could form
a government coalition, and so a new election was held in 2016. Conﬂict
in this campaign was largely about how the preceding negotiations had
developed. Few substantive policies were discussed. After tense negotia-
tions, PP ﬁnally managed to form a government again with the abstention
of PSOE and the support of Ciudadanos. Paradoxically, while the multi-
party scenario seems to reﬂect demands for change in the political system,
the ‘out with the old’ discourse driving these transformations did not
materialise in the conservatives being kicked out of ofﬁce, and Mariano
Rajoy became president for the third time. Yet, in an unexpected turn of
events, PSOE took back the government thanks to a vote of no conﬁdence
against Rajoy supported by regionalist parties held on 13-14 June 2017.
Whether the new actors and lines of conﬂict will stabilise in the long term
remains to be seen. Despite some signs of crystallisation, the demand-side
structure of political competition in Spain remains largely unidimensional
in terms of economic and cultural issues (Vidal 2017).Moreover, the issues
concerning political renewal, upon which the new parties campaigned,
have an expiry date. That is, once parties are established or have assumed
government responsibility, they can hardly sustain a discourse of political
renewal. While political issues have contributed to a reinterpretation of the
cultural dimension, they may in the long term be replaced once again by
‘new’ cultural issues. Indeed, one possibility is that the current conﬁgura-
tion evolves into one like that of the north-western European countries,
with a new cultural divide cross-cutting the economic dimension of poli-
tical competition, encompassing issues such as European integration,
nationalism and immigration. This would open up political spaces through
a combination of new ‘issue packages’ onto which challengers could con-
solidate their positions. For the time being, in this rather exceptional
transition period we ﬁnd little evidence, however, of such a convergence
to a north-western European type of conﬂict structure.
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